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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 03-3917
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
SARA BOST,
Appellant.
____________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Crim. No. 02-265)
District Judge: The Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
______________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1
June 18, 2004
Before: ALITO, SMITH, and WALLACE, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: July 16, 2004)
__________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________
__________________
*The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Senior Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 In the district court, the defendant did not challenge her sentencing under
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and she has not raised Apprendi or 
Blakely v. Washington, 2004 WL 1402697 (June 24, 2004), on appeal.  Moreover,
sentence here was within the guideline range for the base offense level.
2
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Sara Bost pleaded guilty to witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(3).  The parties agreed that her base offense level was 12 pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (2002), and the government recommended that she receive a 2-
point reduction based on her acceptance of responsibility.  The district court,
citing Bost’s alleged involvement in a related bribery scheme, sentenced Bost to
12 months imprisonment, the highest sentence within the applicable guideline
range.  On appeal, Bost argues that the district court committed clear error by
basing her sentence on the bribery allegations.1  
We first reject the government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction over
Bost’s timely appeal.  That the district court imposed a sentence within the
applicable guideline range does not compel the conclusion that jurisdiction is
lacking.  Rather, we may exercise jurisdiction over any “otherwise final
sentence”—including those imposed within the applicable guideline range—when
a defendant claims the sentence “was imposed in violation of law.”  18 U.S.C. §
3742(a)(1); see also United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 2001).
3Bost did not raise a timely objection to the district court’s reliance on the
audiotapes and videotapes, so we review her sentence for plain error.  Nappi, 243
F.3d at 763.
Turning to Bost’s first claim, we agree that the district court had an
obligation to notify the parties of the evidence it might use at sentencing.  See
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); Nappi, 243 F.3d at 763.  The district court did not violate
this notice requirement here.  Transcripts of the recordings were before the district
court and accessible to the parties, and the court went out of its way to warn Bost
at the beginning of the sentencing hearing that such “relevant conduct and offense
conduct is something the Court can take into account.”  Bost clearly grasped the
significance of the district court’s warning, because she specifically “urge[d]” the
court at the sentencing hearing “not to consider those other matters.”  There was
no plain error.
     Second, Bost maintains that the district court should not have applied the
maximum sentence within the applicable guideline range because the government
did not establish her complicity by a preponderance of the evidence.  The cases
Bost cites for this evidentiary standard are inapposite, because they all involve
guideline enhancements.  E.g., United States v. Seiler, 348 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir.
2003); United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Behler,
414 F.3d 1264 (8th Cir. 1994).  A district court’s choice of sentence within a
particular guideline range is a purely discretionary judgment, which does not
necessitate any particular factual findings.  At most, a district court bears a
responsibility to ensure that the evidence consulted for these purposes “has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,” United States v.
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 463 (3d Cir. 1999), quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3,
Commentary, and Bost does not dispute that the audio and video recordings
considered here meet this standard.  Thus, no plain error has been demonstrated in
Bost’s 12-month sentence.  
AFFIRMED.
